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East-West Joint Ventures: Lessons From
Past Soviet-Western Joint Ventures and
Projections for Future Deals With the CIS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past five to six years, former President Mikhail Gorbachev and
a new group of young thinkers have revolutionized the philosophy and
practice of foreign relations in the Soviet Union.' They have rejected the
traditional idea of autarchy, or economic nationalism, and replaced it
with an understanding that they should become part of the world finan-
cial and trading system.2
The Joint Venture Decree of 1987 opened the Soviet Union to West-
ern business for the first time in seventy years. 3 Western business entre-
preneurs have eagerly embraced the idea of accessing both resources and
markets formerly forbidden to them. However, the practical realities of
developing and conducting business in a society with no basic law of con-
tracts, no knowledge of market economics, and no understanding of work
performance tied to rewards has proved daunting.
Joint venture successes, when they have occurred, have involved ex-
tensive negotiations between Western partners and their Soviet business
counterparts plus approvals by principals in the Soviet central ministries,
the republic governments and, sometimes, local administrations. How-
ever, as the republics emerge as sovereign states and central Soviet con-
trol disappears, questions emerge about how best to pursue business with
the new Commonwealth of Independent States.
This essay will review the changes in Soviet law that have led to cur-
rent hospitable business relationships. Next, it will discuss the recent So-
viet societal changes that make continuing steps to establish a joint ven-
ture questionable. Finally, the essay will attempt to marshal insights from
the Soviet experience and project the 'most likely scenarios for future
East-West business.
II. ISOLATIONIST HISTORY
The introduction of Communism during the Russian Revolution of
1917 effectively ended all foreign investment that had been allowed under
1. Richard N. Gardner, The Triple Crisis of the Soviet Union Today, 11 N.Y.L. ScH.
J. INT'L & COMp. L. 435, 437 (1990).
2. Id.
3. Nicole M. Houri, Joint Venture Law in the Soviet Union, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 499, 504 (1990).
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the czarist regime.4 The small beginnings of open trade had ended; the
West was shut out. In March of 1921, Lenin sought to revitalize the So-
viet economy with his New Economic Policy (NEP) by partially restoring
Western business interests. Lenin's 1923 "Law on Concessions" allowed
more foreign participation in Soviet businesses.5 This open market policy
was short lived, however, and in 1930 Josef Stalin outlawed joint ventures
with all foreign firms, stating that it was ideologically improper for any
part of the Soviet Union to be under foreign control.6
Thus, from the late 1920s until the end of 1986, the Soviet Union
exercised absolute state control over foreign trade. 7 Two characteristics
typified this state monopoly: first, private persons were barred from en-
gaging in business transactions with non-socialist partners or from hold-
ing currencies that had value elsewhere; and second, state firms engaged
in production were prohibited from dealing directly with capitalist busi-
nesses.' Foreign trade organizations (FTO's), subordinate to the Ministry
of Foreign Trade, acted as intermediaries and handled all contracts with
foreigners for items available only from the West.9
The FTO's might have been viable had they been able to work di-
rectly with the foreign firms that they served. Instead, national plans is-
sued by "Gosplan," the State Planning Commission, directed the FTO's
negotiations with the West.10 State central planning restrictions also gave
the FTO's a special operational agenda that minimized hard currency ex-
penditures, which normally led to buying the cheapest goods, and that
maximized hard currency return on Soviet produced goods, while com-
pensating Soviet firms only in rubles. This currency return policy de-
creased the incentive for Soviet firms to produce quality goods for ex-
port.1 1 In addition, the FTO's acted as information barriers. Since Soviet
firms had little contact with foreign customers or suppliers, they had no
way to learn about new technology that could enhance their production or
about changes in overseas demand.'
III. THE WINDS OF CHANGE
By the early 1980s, central planning and isolationism had placed the
Soviet economy in decline, triggering the need to re-evaluate Soviet re-
strictions on foreign investment. In 1983, the Soviets approved joint ven-
4. Id. at 500.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Paul B. Stephan III, The Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law and Its Impact
on International Business Transactions, 24 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 89, 90 (1990).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. John P. Feldman, Soviet Joint Ventures: Providing for Appropriate Dispute Res-
olution, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 107, 111 (1990).
11. Stephan, supra note 7.
12. Id. at 91.
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tures with other socialist countries, and by 1986 they had officially started
to discuss partnerships involving Western investors.'3 The Soviet Joint
Venture Decree of January 1987 opened the first avenue for direct invest-
ment in the USSR in over sixty years."'
The government believed that the traditional centrally planned econ-
omy had not provided a level of development equivalent with industrial-
ized capitalist nations. 5 For this reason the government introduced per-
estroika, the policy to allow controlled entry of Western investment and
technology. Joint ventures were seen as the crucial vehicle for stimulating
newly permitted private cooperatives which provided an important source
of Western management skills and technology. 6 From a Western view
point, joint ventures remain attractive because they offer access to what
is potentially the world's largest untapped market for Western goods and
services.17 The Soviet Union also represents a store of abundant natural
resources. 8 General benefits may accrue to the Western world, including
decreased defense spending and greater social and cultural interactions
with Soviet citizens.'"
The disadvantages of conducting business with the Soviet Union con-
tinue: a shortage of materials, unreliability of transportation systems,
20
and the non-convertability of the ruble.2' While it is positive that West-
ern companies can now directly deal with their relevant Soviet counter-
parts, Soviet domestic enterprises simply have very little or no under-
standing of business practices in the West and still less experience with
negotiating and implementing foreign trade contracts. 22
IV. FUNDAMENTALS OF SOVIET JOINT VENTURES
A proposed joint venture with the Soviet Union should meet "Joint
Venture Decree" objectives, as well as the criteria from subsequent proc-
lamations, to gain approval." The Decree states that joint ventures
should be approved for several purposes: to satisfy domestic requirements
for certain types of industrial products, raw materials and food stuffs; to
13. Houri, supra note 3, at 501.
14. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on the Establishment in the Territory of
the USSR and Operation of Joint Ventures with the Participation of Soviet Organizations
and Firms from Capitalist and Developing Countries, No. 49 (Jan. 13, 1987) [hereinafter
Joint Venture Decree]; see also Daniel J. Arbess, A Few Things U.S. Businesspeople
Should Know About Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Lawyer's View, 22 INT'L L. &
POL. 411 (1990).
15. Houri, supra note 3, at 502.
16. Arbess, supra note 14.
17. Id. at 412.
18. Houri, supra note 3, at 502.
19. Id. at 503.
20. Stephan, supra note 7, at 92.
21. Arbess, supra note 14, at 412.
22. Id. at 414.
23. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 14, at art. 1.
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attract advanced foreign technologies, management expertise, additional
material and financial resources to the USSR national economy; to ex-
pand exports; and to reduce superfluous imports. 4 The Decree also lists
other areas for expansion: research and design, engineering, sales and
marketing, finance, and service industries such as tourism. 5
The three phases of development involved in creating joint ventures
are discussion, contract negotiations, and official registration. 6 Successful
discussions with a legally recognized prospective Soviet partner and the
relevant government officials will lead to the signing of a protocol letter or
letter of intent.2 7 Though not binding, this letter captures each venturer's
understanding of its respective responsibilities and the general goals of
the joint venture.2 8
A feasibility study will then follow to more fully examine the ven-
ture's possible difficulties and to clarify each partner's role. 26 This study
includes a cost analysis, projected earnings, and technical assumptions."
Finally, the necessary joint venture documents are prepared, including
the joint venture agreement, the joint venture statute and all ancillary
contracts, and submitted for approval to the USSR Ministry of Finance
for registration, and to the administrative organ that exercises control
over the Soviet partner.3 1
The joint venture is also required to specify the objectives of its oper-
ation.12 The concept of "ultra vires" is treated very seriously by Soviet
authorities, and there is evidence that joint ventures with overly broad
objectives may not be approved. 3 More importantly, Western companies
must recognize that the Soviets place great emphasis on the written
word.' They negotiate contract terms carefully and will rely on a con-
tract as an accurate and exclusive reflection of the matters contained
therein. Their position tends to be that what is not explicitly permitted
by the written terms of any agreement or contract is not permitted at
all.35
Soviet tax law, labor law and property law are all binding on the joint
venture partners, unless they are exempt under international treaties to
24. Id. at art. 1 § 3.
25. Decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on
Additional Measures to Improve the Country's External Economic Activity in the New Con-
ditions of Economic Managment, No. 1074 (Sept. 17, 1987).
26. Houri, supra note 3, at 503.
27. Id.
28. Feldman, supra note 10, at 115.
29. Houri, supra note 3, at 503-504.
30. Feldman, supra note 10, at 115.
31. Houri, supra note 3.
32. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 14, at art. 7.
33. Id. at art. 51.




which the USSR is party." In addition, Article 1 of the Joint Venture
Decree should be of particular concern to the Western partner, since it
allows the Soviets to control joint ventures by enacting "other legislative
acts of the USSR and Union Republics.1
3 7
All the above considerations have required Western partners to an-
ticipate and address many potential contractual issues to maximize the
success of the venture. Broad economic reforms, republic and central gov-
ernment laws, as well as the evolving structure of joint venture arrange-
ments have had to be constantly monitored so that the negative impacts
of any political or legal change could be minimized.
A. Status of Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union
As of January 1, 1990 there were 1,274 registered Soviet joint ven-
tures with foreign partners. 8 However, only 184 of them had successfully
maneuvered their way through the system and begun operations.3 9 Mat-
ters of implementation have been complicated by the fact that Western
companies cannot necessarily depend on their Soviet partners to guide
them through the changing political and legal terrain.
B. Legal and Operational Concerns
The Soviet legal system is immature. Unlike a country possessing an
established legal framework and body of precedent, the parties to a joint
venture in the Soviet Union have had to negotiate and document many
seemingly "standard" legal and business issues.40 There is no Soviet
equivalent of the Delaware Corporation Code - partners must establish
a basic corporate framework for governance."'
The basic legal and business concerns of contribution valuation,
profit repatriation, property rights, financing, taxes, and dispute resolu-
tion, plus special operational concerns about workers and supplies, have
,all had to be addressed. Any one area has the potential of derailing a
business deal. The following sections outline how each of these business
concerns has been dealt with in the past.
1. Contribution Valuation
Western partners need to determine early in the process how much
to invest in a venture, and what share of equity capital this investment
will represent. Soviet joint venture law permits many types of capital con-
36. Houri, supra note 3, at 505.
37. Id.
38. FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 1990, at 14.
39. Id.
40. Jeffery A. Burt, Joint Venture Experience: Observations on the Business and Le-
gal Challenges, 22 INT'L L. & POL. 435, 445 (1990).
41. Id.
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tributions."I Because the ruble is not a convertible currency, the Western
partner is most likely to contribute hard currency and technology, while
the Soviets will tend to provide mineral and property rights.4" The 1987
Decree allows the parties to determine their respective equity shares by
negotiation and to appraise their contributions in either rubles or hard
currency."' Such negotiations ultimately focus on valuation: determining
the value of the goods and services each partner proposes to contribute in
exchange for their equity.45
Unfortunately, how to value each partner's contributions is one of
the most difficult portions of the joint venture process. The Joint Venture
Decree says contributions shall be valued by referring to world market
prices, but it offers little direction on how to attach value to assets for
which there is no market in the Soviet Union."' "Specifically, the value of
Soviet real estate and natural resources will be difficult to assess because
Soviets have consistently appraised them below market value by Western
standards." 7 Likewise, there is no common standard by which the West-
ern partner's "know-how" can be valuated."
As a starting point, evidence of prior sales and valuations (particu-
larly sales in the East Bloc), sales by comparable companies, current pro-
duction costs, the value of licensing similar technology, and the cost of
producing equivalent technology in the USSR can be submitted by the
Western partner for examination."9 The best approach so far appears to
be to value the Soviet contribution in rubles and the Western contribu-
tion in hard currency.5" This gives the Western partner a hedge against
the risk of capital dissolution related to planned devaluations of the ru-
ble.5 ' By using this technique, a devaluation of the ruble would simply
decrease the relative value of the Soviet partner's share resulting in a re-
distribution of equity ownership."2 The mechanism for carrying out such
a redistribution should be spelled out in a clause in the joint venture
agreement specifically requiring the parties to revalue the ruble value of
capital contributions.
2. Profit Repatriation
The ruble's non-convertability is a major obstacle to Western compa-
nies contemplating joint ventures in the USSR.5" While both of the part-
42. Houri, supra note 3, at 509.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Arbess, supra note 14, at 416.
46. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 14, at art. 12.
47. Houri, supra note 3, at 509.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Arbess, supra note 14, at 419.
51. Id. at 418.
52. Id. at 419.
53. Id. at 430.
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ners want the venture to earn money, the Western investor is mainly in-
terested in repatriating profits while the Soviet investor's need is to
increase the government's hard currency supply by keeping profits in the
country."4 Foreign partners have a guaranteed right under the Joint Ven-
ture Decree to transfer their share of profits abroad. 55 However, this right
is worthless unless the joint venture has foreign currency available for
this purpose. The average Soviet family does not have hard currency to
spend so Western joint venture partners cannot expect to receive the type
of money that they can repatriate from sales to the Soviet domestic
market."
To partially overcome this barrier to profit repatriation, the Soviets
allowed the American Trade Consortium, a grouping of U.S. companies,
to pool their respective joint venture generated foreign exchange cash
flows."' This allows the consortium members who have joint ventures fo-
cused toward export markets to exchange excess amounts of hard cur-
rency at negotiated rates with other consortium members who sell prod-
ucts to the Soviet market for rubles. Another option that the Soviets have
considered is using a special ruble backed by their gold reserves that
would be convertible into Western currencies.5 8
Counter-trade deals have been the more usual way for joint ventures
to earn hard currency. These deals allow Western goods to be exchanged
for Soviet goods that are later sold for hard currency to the West.5 9 Ap-
proximately half of all Eastern European contracts currently have some
counter-trade provisions. In fact, it is estimated that one quarter of all
world trade is actually counter-trade."0 Combustion Engineering, for ex-
ample, became the first U.S. partner in a Soviet joint venture,6 1 using a
counter-trade arrangement where it sells computer software and process-
ing equipment to Soviet refineries and receives Soviet-produced petro-
chemicals as payment, which it then sells to other Western companies for
hard currency.6 2 Pepsico has counter-traded bottling factories and syrup
for vodka. 3 Pepsico also agreed to train Soviet workers and to assist with
bottling plant engineering, design, and construction. Twenty-six bottling
plants now exist in the Soviet Union.6 '
One obstacle to counter-trade is the scarcity of Soviet commodities
that meet quality standards necessary to make goods exportable to West-
54. Houri, supra note 3, at 509-510.
55. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 14, at art. 32.
56. Houri, supra note 3, at 510.
57. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1989, at D4.
58. Houri, supra note 3, at 511.
59. Id. at 510.
60. Leo Welt, Unconventional Forms of Financing: Buy-Back! Compensation/Barter,
22 INT'L L. & POL. 461, 467 (1990).
61. Burt, supra note 40, at 438.
62. Houri, supra note 3, at 511.
63. Burt, supra note 40, at 439.
64. Welt, supra note 60, at 466.
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ern markets6 5 If the commoditites do meet Western market standards,
the Soviet manufacturer may decide to market the products abroad itself,
thereby avoiding the role of the joint venture "middleman."6 6
3. Property Rights
Property rights, based on the presumption that each party to a trans-
action understands what it receives for what it gives, are the foundation
for commercial transactions in the West. 7 Western joint venture laws
have historically given the joint venture itself all property rights, or al-
lowed the individual parties to retain ownership of their separate
contributions.6
The Soviet partner's main contribution to a joint venture typically is
the right to use land areas and other resources. 9 However, a Soviet part-
ner does not "own" the land that is contributed, since all land in the
Soviet Union is "within the exclusive ownership of the State."7 All natu-
ral resources, land and water are leasable to joint ventures under terms
decided upon by the Council of Ministers.' Procedural rules and the type
of resources involved guide decisions by the Council on what fees to
charge for the right to use lands or resources .
2
Before the 1990 amendment to the Soviet Constitution, private own-
ership of the means of production was historically forbidden by both
Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet Constitution. 7'3 The Supreme
Soviet began reworking its private property laws beginning in 1988 with
the Law on Cooperatives. 4 Cooperatives became the first private firms to
legally hire employees and amass capital.' 5
More liberal measures were added in the winter of 1989 and 1990
with the enactment of the Fundamentals of Leasing Legislation, which
established a legal basis for transferring possession and use of state prop-
erty to private firms. The Fundamentals of Land Legislation, the Law on
Property and associated constitutional amendments followed, and subse-
quently reworked the definition of property rights in the Soviet Union. 6
Currently, legislation recognizes state, collective and citizens' property,
65. Houri, supra note 3, at 511.
66. Id.
67. Stephan, supra note 7, at 93.
68. Houri, supra note 3, at 508.
69. Arbess, supra note 14, at 417.
70. KONST. SSSR (1977), art. 11, reprinted in F. J.M. FELDBRUGGE, THE CONSITUTION
OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS: ANALYSIS, TEXTS, REPORTS 111 (1979).
71. Procedure Assessing the Land, Natural Resources, Buildings and Structures Form-
ing Part of the Soviet Parties' Contribution to the Authorized Capital of Joint Ventures for
Temporary Use § 1.1 (Feb. 9, 1988).
72. Id. at § 2.1.






with the latter two categories including private productive assets." Pri-
vate ownership of land is still forbidden.
Individuals can invest only in firms with which they maintain some
labor relationship. Property and non-property personal rights can be ac-
quired by a joint venture in its own name.78 Joint ventures are protected,
under Article 17 of the 1987 decree, in a manner quite similar to Soviet
state organizations, including protection allowances for copyrights and
patents.7 Ownership of technology is not covered by Soviet law.80
A startling development was the October 26, 1990 Presidential De-
cree which authorized direct investment by foreigners in the Soviet econ-
omy."' The decree may well place foreigners on an equal basis with Soviet
citizens in terms of rights recently created and protected by property
legislation. 2
4. Financing
Article 27 of the Joint Venture Decree allows joint ventures to use
both rubles and convertible currencies to raise debt capital.8 "
Vnesheconombank (the USSR Bank for Foreign Trade) has made initial
financing directly available to joint ventures in foreign currency from
non-Soviet sources. 8
4
The dominant issue for a Western bank is how a loan is collateral-
ized. Increasingly, the borrowers involved will be self-financing, privately-
owned businesses formed in the image of Soviet cooperatives or other
forms of associations.8 In the past, banks have been willing to finance
joint ventures when the Western partner backs the venture with guaran-
tees, or when the partners pledge equity interests in the joint venture.8 8
However, joint venture partners will continue to prefer to pledge joint
venture assets.
8 7
As as result, Western banks are considering increased "limited re-
course" financing based on traditional project finance credit evaluation
criteria. An example is the recent cooperation between Moscow Narodny
Bank (a Soviet-owned U.K. bank based in London), and the Finnish Pos-
tipankki Bank that provided $10.7 million in financing for a joint venture
hotel renovation in Tallinn, Estonia. 8 The Finnish partners have par-
77. Id. at 94.
78. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 14, at art. 6.
79. Houri, supra note 3, at 508.
80. Id.
81. Stephan, supra note 7, at 91.
82. Id.





88. MNB in USSR Joint Ventures, TRADE FINANCE, Apr. 1989, at 5.
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tially guaranteed the loan, but a major portion of the loan is secured by a
collateral assignment of a construction contract, as well as by the part-
ners' promise to ensure sufficient occupancy rates and to guarantee high
management standards.89
5. Taxes
In the recent three and one half year period when joint ventures have
been allowed, nine separate legislative or regulatory acts related to joint
venture taxation have been issued by five separate governmental groups.9 0
In January of 1987, the Council of Ministers first allowed establishment
of joint ventures, provided that they would be taxed at thirty percent of
their profits, with an exemption from payment for the first two years of
operation.9" A September 1987 joint decree from the USSR Central Com-
mittee and the Council of Ministers modified the original tax holiday so
that it would run from the time when declared profits were first re-
ceived. 2 This is an important benefit for Western partners because a
joint venture might not produce profits for up to ten years. 3 Payment of
the thirty percent profits tax can be indefinitely delayed if the joint ven-
ture's earnings are used for expansion, or to increase its various reserve
and development funds.
9 4
In December 1988, a Decree was adopted by the Council of Ministers
extending the tax holiday for joint ventures in the Far Eastern economic
region to three years after profits are first declared." In 1989, the USSR's
Supreme Soviet Presidium gave the Council of Ministers more flexibility
in granting reductions and exemptions from taxation to joint ventures.9 6
The most recent enactment was the June 1990 "Law on the Taxes on
Enterprises, Associations and Organizations," which limited tax conces-
sions to joint ventures in two ways: first, profits are to be taxed at thirty
percent only if the foreign partner's investment in the capital fund ex-
ceeds thirty percent, otherwise the tax rate is the same as for other Soviet
enterprises (maybe as high as forty-five percent); second, service and
other non-production oriented joint ventures, plus fishing or mineral ex-
traction joint ventures are no longer eligible for the tax holiday. 7
In addition to the profits tax, a twenty percent withholding tax is
89. Id.
90. Michael Newcity, Tax Issues in Soviet Joint Ventures, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163, 168
(1990).
91. Id. at 169.
92. Id. at 170.
93. Houri, supra note 3, at 513.
94. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 14, at art. 30.
95. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on the Further Development of Foreign
Economic Activities of State, Cooperative, and other Public Enterprises, Entities, and Orga-
nizations, No. 1405, arts. 28, 31 (Dec. 2, 1988).
96. Newcity, supra note 90, at 171.
97. Id. at 172.
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also levied on all profits repatriated by Western partners. 8 However,
since the USSR has entered into double taxation agreements including
provisions relating to the taxation of royalty, interest and dividend in-
come with most of its Western trading partners, it is likely that the joint
venture will be relieved from paying part, or all of this withholding tax if
the transaction is structured so that a portion of the profits are character-
ized as royalty payments, interest or dividends."
Finally, foreign employees of a joint venture must pay income tax in
the USSR if they are located there for more than 183 days during a calen-
dar year.'0 New legislation, in effect as of July 1, 1990, imposes a sixty
percent tax rate on monthly incomes in excess of 3,000 rubles.'0 ' Since
many of the non-Soviet employees of a Western-Soviet joint venture will
earn more than this amount, which is equivalent to a $60,000 annual in-
come, the resulting tax liability imposed on foreign employees is
substantial. '
Change has been the predominant characteristic of Soviet tax policy
toward joint ventures since the 1987 Joint Venture Decree.'0 3 It is fair to
say the current laws are only temporary. Another area of considerable
potential change lies with the republics and local authorities. Several of
them are drafting their own tax laws and all are likely to play a much
greater role in future taxation of joint ventures. '
6. Dispute Resolution
Article 20 of the 1987 Joint Venture Decree provides that disputes
shall be settled "according to legislation of the USSR either by the USSR
courts or, by common consent of both sides, by an arbitration tribu-
nal."' 0 5 The term "courts" in the Soviet context actually refers to their
economic regulation and enforcement system called arbitrazh.'"9 Arbi-
trazh is an administrative agency that implements and. then monitors na-
tional economic plans through union and republic level branches. ' It
functions much like a court of law in that it hears cases after there has
been a private resolution attempt.'0 8 Whether arbitrazh should ever be
used for dispute resolution for joint ventures is questionable given its ad-
ministrative nature and its adherence to the Soviet economic plan.' 9
98. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 14, at art. 41.
99. Newcity, supra note 90, at 189 n.133.
100. Id. at 202.
101. Id. at 203.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 206.
104. Id. at 207.
105. Feldman, supra note 10, at 116.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 117.
109. Id. at 118.
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U.S. federal courts could be used for a Soviet-U.S. joint venture dis-
pute if the hurdle of potential sovereign immunity under the Federal For-
eign Sovereign Immunity Act could be overcome."' However, it is not
clear whether federal or state law would be applied, and, if the Soviet
partner does not have assets in the U.S., the U.S. partner cannot enforce
the judgment.' The application of foreign law is not unknown, however.
For example, Swedish courts were utilized in 1988 when the American
Trade Consortium persuaded its Soviet partner to arbitrate disputes. 1 2
Arbitration may be the best way to adapt an agreement to unfore-
seen changes.1 The joint venture agreement should contain a section
covering arbitration in three parts. First, a general clause covering all dis-
putes is necessary, and should specify the language to be used as well as
acceptance of the UNCITRAL rules, which permit the selection of an in-
stitution capable of assisting with the administration and organization of
the dispute resolution. The drafting of the arbitration clause should be
supervised by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, a recognized inter-
national arbitration institution. Second, a clause distinguishing technical
disputes to be arbitrated by "on site" experts and reviewable by the tri-
bunal is necessary in the general arbitration clause. Finally, it is impor-
tant to include a clause recognizing areas where increased contact with
the state would be beneficial to the-enterprise and where certain actions
would warrant submission to arbitrazh.1 4
7. Labor
Supervising and motivating a local work force that has traditionally
not been rewarded for productivity is a difficulty that has always affected
foreign investments in Eastern Bloc countries.'1 In fact, the preamble to
the USSR Constitution contains the Soviet ideology of eliminating capi-
talist exploitation of the people."'
Soviet labor law is "voluminous and complex," consisting of labor
codes and uncodified statutes promulgated by both federal and republic
lawmakers."' In addition, there are countless regulatory decrees designed
to implement statutes. The decrees are so numerous and detailed that
they are often more important than the underlying statutes."8 Local
norms also play an important role in labor concerns. Finally, USSR and
110. Id.
111. Id. at 119.
112. Houri, supra note 3, at 505.
113. Feldman, supra note 10, at 119.
114. Id. at 129.
115. Houri, supra note 3, at 514.
116. F.J.M. Feldbrugge, The Constitution of the USSR, 16 REv. SOCIALIST L. 163, 167
(1990) (citing the USSR CONSTITUTION, preamble).
117. Kevin P. Block, The Disciplining and Dismissal of Employees by Joint Ventures
in the USSR, 23 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 619, 621 (1990).
118. Id. at 622.
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republic courts periodically issue "guiding explanations" to lower
courts." 9
On the whole, there are four notable characteristics of Soviet labor
law. First, there is an extraordinarily powerful role assigned to trade un-
ions; second, the central government regulates many issues that are left to
bargaining in Western cultures; third, the system is very protective of
workers; and fourth, there is a quick and inexpensive, if not always equi-
table, means to resolve employee disputes. 2 ' Two fundamental concepts
underlie all of Soviet labor law: "all Soviet citizens have a right to a job
and all able-bodied citizens have a corresponding duty to work."''
Under the 1987 Decree, over half of a joint venture's employees had
to be Soviets, which required that joint ventures abide by the very strin-
gent requirements of Soviet labor law.' 2 ' From the perspective of the
Western partner, the December 1988 Decree appeared to simplify em-
ployment matters by permitting questions of hiring and dismissal, the
form and scale of labor pay, and material incentives to be determined in
negotiations between the parties.' 3 Read literally, this language would
return the USSR to the employment-at-will doctrine."24
'The validity of this provision is highly questionable, however, since it
violates Soviet labor laws, the Soviet Constitution,"25 and is in opposition
to powerful ideological, historical and political precedents. 126 A concrete
example concerns dismissals. Soviet labor law requires an exclusive list of
grounds for termination and prior union consent for most dismissals. 27
Courts will not only reverse a dismissal that was put into effect without
union consent, but will charge the responsible managers with personal
fines. 128
The May 1989 Decree now says that decisions by a joint venture on
these matters must be consistent with all the USSR "legislative acts" that
govern the rights of its citizens."12 But "legislative acts" is a general
phrase. It is not clear whether "legislative acts" are intended to include
general norms applicable to Soviet citizens, or only the specific legislative
acts applicable to state enterprise employees. 30
Without being able to offer meaningful material incentives to en-
courage increased quality and production, Soviet enterprises have re-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 622-632.
121. Id. at 623.
122. Houri, supra note 3, at 514.
123. Arbess, supra note 14, at 424.
124. Block, supra note 117, at 626.
125. Houri, supra note 3, at 515.
126. Block, supra note 117, at 626.
127. Id. at 625.
128. Id.
129. Arbess, supra note 14, at 424.
130. Id.
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sorted to a complex system of punishment for those who do not follow the
rules.'" Articles 127 through 138 of the RSFSR Labor Code cover disci-
pline and speak in very general terms of employee obligations while im-
posing a long list of duties on management.132 Only a few people are al-
lowed to impose discipline, and failure to follow the proper steps
(including requesting a written explanation of the event from the em-
ployee, receiving permission from the trade union to administer disci-
pline, issuing a directive enunciating the basis for the discipline and giv-
ing it to the employee no later than three days after its issuance for the
employee's signature) may render the disciplinary measures void.'3 3
The grounds for actual dismissal of an employee are limited by Arti-
cles 33 and 254 of the labor code.' Among those most likely to be im-
posed by a joint venture are:
a. Violation of Labor Discipline. A frequently litigated action,
which allows an employer to terminate an employment contract for
"inadequate work performance, insubordination, or other numerous
forms of unsatisfactory behavior."
135
b. Abenteeism. Many of these cases arise in connection with
transfers. Since employees must consent to a transfer to another job,
employees who feel they have been improperly transferred sometimes
do not report to their new positions."4' Dismissals in these cases will
stand only if the transfer was legal.
c. Layoffs. The labor code recognizes this as a permissible ground
for dismissal, but it has been largely unused in the USSR."' Certain
employees are classified as having preferential rights to remain at
work, but performance results are not listed as a criteria for that
right." 8 Two months notice must be provided and, if possible, the em-
ployee must be provided with alternative work." 9
d. Flagrant Breach of Duty. Nothing in the statute indicates
what actions or inactions constitute a flagrant breach, and it is unclear
whether a court or the joint venture's board of directors would review
such a dismissal since a joint venture isn't under a ministry's
jurisdiction."0
e. Loss of Confidence. Intentional wrongdoing is not required,
131. Block, supra note 117, at 627.
132. Id. at 628.
133. Id. at 631-632.
134. Id. at 639.
135. Id. at 640.
136. Id. at 641-642.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 643.
139. Id. at 644.
140. Id. at 645.
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just an improper act indicating extreme carelessness"' There must be
individualized proof of wrongdoing. 42
f. Miscellaneous. This includes inability to work for more than
four months unless it is due to a job related accident; a person who
previously held the job reclaims the position; the employee is not
qualified; the employee is committed by a court to a drug or alcohol
rehabilitation program; and immoral acts committed by people in the
educational system.'
Trade unions also have the authority to dismiss management em-
ployees under Soviet law.'44 Potential targets of a trade union demand for
dismissal include all individuals in the management staff.14 5 With this au-
thority, unions instituted more than 6,000 administrative actions in 1979
against management officials, which resulted in 146 dismissals. By 1985,
the number of actions had almost doubled. 46
8. Procurement and Product Quality
Product quality in the USSR is strongly dependant on access to sup-
plies.147 Unlike state enterprises, joint ventures are not guaranteed access
to sources of natural resources and production materials, nor are they
guaranteed a market for their resulting products and services. 8 A No-
vember 1988 amendment to the 1987 Joint Venture decree allowed joint
ventures to use either hard currency or rubles to purchase supplies di-
rectly from Soviet producers."'4 But purchasing supplies has been troub-
lesome since joint ventures have no priority and manufacturers few goods
left after filling state plan orders. 5 '
Importation of equipment, materials and other property is an alter-
native supply source. 5 ' Only convertible currency, however, can be used
to make payments.5 2 Soviet customs has also remained unclear about
how it will treat components that are sent regularly from overseas as con-
tributions that are not part of equity.'53
Chronic supply shortages and no industry competition have resulted
in inferior product quality and low Soviet consumer expectations. Yet
quality must be high to meet Western standards, or the Western partner
141. Id.
142. Id. at 646.
143. Id. at 647.
144. Id. at 649.
145. Id. at 650.
146. Id. at 649-650.
147. Houri, supra note 3, at 516.
148. Arbess, supra note 14, at 428.
149. Houri, supra note 3, at 516.
150. Id.
151. Arbess, supra note 14, at 429.
152. Houri, supra note 3, at 516.
153. Arbess, supra note 14, at 429.
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will not want to lend its trade name."" The McDonald's joint venture
required over twelve years to negotiate, partly because McDonald's qual-
ity standards could only be met by establishing a large farm outside Mos-
cow to grow potatoes and other food products. 55 But very few Western
companies can afford to invest as heavily as McDonald's, which brought
in its own supply chain and production equipment for the staggering sum
of $50 million. 6
V. THE NEW PLAYING FIELD
Joint ventures may not have thrived in the environment described
above, but they had made headway in the new liberalized world of per-
estroika. Before the disintegration of the USSR, the Soviet central gov-
ernment was beginning to have some market-based business experience to
rely on, and further market expansion was planned.
However, changes catalyzed by the "controlled" release of informa-
tion, glasnost, were not complete. After seventy years of threatening the
whole world, the Soviet Union split apart in six short years. What hap-
pened? In changing the nature of power relations the Soviet Union had to
change its ideology, which had guaranteed "an absence of serious national
conflicts, a quiescent working class and the solidarity of the ruling
elite. 1 57 Gorbachev chose to implement the change by limiting the Com-
munist party and exposing its vices. However, control of the relevant in-
formation was quickly lost, resulting in discredit to the legitimacy of So-
viet rule as a whole. 58
Wall Street Journal headlines on Monday, December 23, 1991, offi-
cially announced the end: "Eleven Republics Lay USSR to Rest.""5 9 On
December 11, 1991, Russia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine created the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They accepted the popular
demands for independence by the republics, framed a confederation, and
intended to allow non-communist private enterprise and private markets
to flourish. 6 ' Eight of the remaining nine Republics, Azerbaijan, Arme-
nia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Moldavia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbeki-
stan, signed on as co-founders on December 21 and 22, 1991.' Georgia
joined the CIS early in 1992 following the resolution of its internal fight-
ing over republic leadership."6 2
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161. Rubinfien, supra note 159.
162. Slavic Shakeout, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1992, at A12.
VOL. 20:3
EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES
The republics had reacted to the new information filtering out of the
Kremlin with a surge of nationalism. 63 The people were informed that
the Baltics did not join the Soviet Union voluntarily, but were part of a
secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Hitler and Stalin; that the
placement of Nagorno-Karabakh in the territory of Azerbaijan was part
of a strategy of divide and rule; and that the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33
which claimed the lives of millions was artificially induced.""'
The breakup of the world's last great empire is actually an enormous
process of decolonization. 65 The Soviet empire was not the Russian em-
pire; the Russians were colonized just as much as the people in the
Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan. 6 '
When the fictional world of Soviet ideology was removed, the repub-
lics rediscovered their own history and recovered in spirit, if not in name,
separate statehood. 6 7 The August coup attempt, with its threat to plunge
the republics back into the repressive conditions of old, catalyzed the
Russian spirit and moved an outraged citizenry into the streets in defense
of their new-found freedoms. Afterward, it may well have been
Gorbachev's continued insistence on maintaining a powerful central gov-
ernment which finally solidified the resolve of the republics' leaders to
reject the Soviet system.'
What does this mean for existing Western-Soviet joint ventures? Do
we start again? Will all the rules be new? How should a new joint venture
begin? The answers to all these questions lie in following the lead of the
republics. The foundation for the Commonwealth is state indepen-
dence. 6 ' The only agreements reached in the early days of the CIS were
that pricing policies would be coordinated, the ruble would remain the
common currency (though sources differed on whether the Ukraine in-
tended to issue its own), each republic would pursue its own economic
policy, each republic would have equal status in the CIS, central military
leadership would transition to military groups in each republic, and Rus-
sia would occupy the Soviet Union's General Assembly and Security
Council seats inthe United Nations. 70
In truth, the world has twelve new nations to learn about, plus the
three Baltic Republics already granted independence earlier in 1991. If
the revolution had been pre-planned, the various republics would have
negotiated a pact long ago with provisions for an association of free na-
163. Satter, supra note 157.
164. Id.
165. Jack F. Matlock Jr., The Politics of Russian Economic Reform, WALL ST. J., Nov.
5, 1991, at A6.
166. Id.
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tions with a common currency, a common economic space and centralized
control over weapons of mass destruction.' Lacking such forethought,
what is clear now is that the nations that made up the Soviet Union must
move apart before they can find their way back to a limited union. 72
From a Western perspective, our first step is to learn as much as possible
about our new business partners (See Appendix).
A. The Republics: Tension between Interdependence and Separation
From the start, the union was actually a confederation formed from
national or multinational entities that were often artificially defined., 73
When it was formed in 1922, the Soviet Union consisted of Russia, two
republics (the Ukraine and Belorussia), two confederations (the Peoples
Republics of Central Asia and Turkestan), plus an ersatz confederation of
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 17" The reorganization of Central Asia
resulted in five republics roughly divided along ethnic lines, and which
were officially added to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s: Uzbeki-
stan (1925), Turkmenistan (1925), Tadzhikistan (1929), Kazakhstan
(1936), and Kirgizia (1936).11 Next, Bessarabia was annexed from
Romania to form Moldavia and finally, in 1940, the Baltics (Latvia, Lith-
uania and Estonia) were incorporated as a result of the now notorious
Hitler-Stalin agreement. 179
Today, the 286 million people who live in the CIS and the Baltic
states are from the same geographic regions where their ancestors have
lived for centuries;177 but in creating its new world order, the Socialists
tried to level any cultural differences by depriving people of their home-
lands through deportation, radical changes in living conditions, and
forced changes in ethnic composition via in-migration and resettle-
ment."'7 8 Much of the discontent in the republics today is directly tied to
the depletion of natural resources, and the cultural and environmental
degradation of cities and farms by central planning authorities.
79
1. Interdependence
The republics must first face the realization that most of them can-
not exist on their own.'"0 The majority of Soviet products are made from
171. Matlock Jr., supra note 165, at col. 4.
172. Id.
173. Thomas J. Samuelian, Cultural Ecology and Gorbachev's Restructured Union, 32
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raw materials or parts from more than one republic. 18 The central plan-
ners gave the republics bits and pieces of industry and agriculture, but
ensured that no republic was self sufficient in goods or services.182 A few
notable facts include:
a. Russia produces ninety per cent of the oil and most of the nat-
ural gas output of the Soviet Union,183 but still must import grain
from the Ukraine and the West, cotton from the Central Asian Re-
publics, and meat and dairy products from the Baltics.
184
b. The Baltics depend on other republics for two-thirds of their
goods and services.' 88
c. Armenia has the only factory that makes a filter used in all
power stations. Without it, there is no electricity and lights go out
everywhere. 88
d. Uzbekistan was largely self-sufficient in food until central plan-
ning decided in the 1950s that the Soviet Union needed more cotton.
So, five million farmers there were forced to switch. Now, Uzbekistan
produces seventy per cent of the Soviet Union's cotton while it im-
ports food.
87
e. Mongolia lacks a dependable telephone system, facsimile ma-
chines are almost unknown and its people, primarily from rural areas,
are ignorant about a market driven system. 88
f. Moldavia and Georgia are in critical need of enormous invest-
ments in infrastructure - from road construction to phone
systems.1 8
An economy like this is particularly susceptible to disruption if inter-
republic trade breaks down. The pursuit of independence and separate
currencies risks just such a breakdown. 90 Only Russia, the Ukraine, and
possibly Uzbekistan may have the resources and hard currency earning
potential to survive a collapse in intra-republic trade,' 9 ' but even that is
doubtful considering their commitment to service their share of the old
181. Craig Forman, Soviet Economy Holds Potential Disaster As the Union Weakens,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 1991, at Al.
182. Id. at A6.
183. Elisabeth Rubinfien, Yeltsin Seizes Control of Soviet Resources, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 18, 1991, at A13.
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Union's foreign debt.192 A leading Soviet scientist, Yevgeny Velikhov,
warned that failure to preserve at least some current economic links
would "turn the Soviet Union into little more than a Third World pro-
ducer of raw materials."'93
There is no indication of what will happen to the long-term agree-
ment that allows U.S. grain exports to go to the Soviet Union.'94 The
central government agency Exportkhleb bought for all republics; some
are now considering importing on their own, others can't afford individual
importing. 95 Conditions for a successful new federation include rapid
agreements on a monetary system, a customs union so that republics
won't set up tariff barriers against each other, and an agreement on uni-
form commercial and civil laws.' 96
2. Separation Activity
"The hypernationalism dominating life in many republics interferes
with rational economic decision-making," says Andrei Kortunov, a politi-
cal analyst at the Soviet Academy of Sciences.' Squabbles over natural
resources and economic assets pit the republics against each other.' Es-
calation can be expected when they confront, for example, who controls
genuinely Soviet assets such as Aeroflot, the national airline, and who will
pay what portion of the Soviet Union's existing sixty four billion hard
currency debt. '99
"Its working by seizure," says Abraham Becker, director of the Rand
Corporation's UCLA Center for Soviet Studies in California. "If it's in my
back yard, it's mine."200 Examples include the Baltic Republics and Rus-
sia who are claiming control over federal assets in their territory.2 's Azer-
baijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan say oil located on their land belongs
to them.20 2
The republics also have different foreign policy interests. For exam-
ple, Tadjikistan is a predominantly Muslim republic that sees itself tied
to Europe, but has interests that are different from Russia.2 °0 Most re-
publics want consular, cultural and economic affairs to be directed by
192. Id.
193. Forman, supra note 181.
194. Id. at A6.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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their own people.20 4
The need to exhibit true independence is also evidenced by the
following:
a. Russian President Boris Yeltsin freed price controls for many
products on January 2, 1992.205 He also reduced foreign aid and cred-
its to all countries, began charging market prices for Russia's natural
resources, sold or gave away government-owned housing and unprofit-
able state farms, and ended the uncontrolled printing of currency. 0 6
In April of 1992, state controlled energy prices were also freed.20 7 The
Russian economic-reform team has maintained a strict credit policy
since the first of the year to stabilize the economy.
b. Russia is also taking control of Soviet gold reserves, diamonds,
precious metals, and oil exports, which are the main collateral for the
nation in its efforts to secure more international credit.20 8 Russia pro-
duces sixty seven per cent of Soviet gold and has claimed control of
the entire resource, notwithstanding the theory that republics in a
new union should mutually work out a plan to divide debt obligations
and resources.20 9
c. The Ukraine plans to introduce its own currency and has
banned exports of scarce consumer goods to other republics.210 How-
ever, soaring prices in Russia have forced the issuance of a temporary
coupon currency.21I A capital fund has been created for the republic's
new National Bank of Ukraine and special multiple-use coupons are
now used in Ukrainian stores to prevent the out-flow of goods to other
republics. 212
d. Both Russia and Ukraine have laid claim to the 300-ship Black
Sea fleet which sales out of Sevastopol, a Ukrainian port."2
e. Mongolia plans to privatize most state enterprises and coopera-
tives, sell land to private investors, wipe out debts of companies to be
sold, provide credit to new small businesses, and train brokers, bank-
ers, and managers in the ways of the market." 4
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f. Georgia is allowing foreign companies to bid for mineral water
concessions."'
g. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are negotiating with foreign petro-
leum firms, including Chevron and Amoco, for oil exploration
rights.2 16 Elf Aquitaine, a French owned oil giant, signed a pact with
Kazakhstan in February of 1992 to allow oil exploration and produc-
tion sharing.217
h. Almost half of Afganistan's total revenue is made from natural
gas sales.2 18 It is offering to sell its huge reserves to European markets
for cash to rebuild its economy.219
3. Economic, Ethnic and Leadership Difficulties
As if the independence/separation tug-of-war wasn't enough, eco-
nomic, ethnic and leadership problems are ripping at the core of the CIS's
existence. The country is lurching through a draconian depression: GNP
fell by ten per cent in the first half of 1991, while the budget deficit bal-
looned to over thirty three and one half billion dollars.220 Since prices
were liberalized in January of 1992, the Russian inflation rate has rock-
eted upward by 300%, while production has dropped by half in some sec-
tors.22 ' Yeltsin's program did not allow for industry privatizations along
with price increases, so factories remain state owned and no real competi-
tion has begun. 22  Instead, true to their bureaucratic training, factories
jointly have raised all their prices to a higher fixed level to insure their
mutual survival.22 Central planning has simply been replaced by self-im-
posed industry controls at a high cost to the common people.
Winter hit the republics in midstride between the old system and the
new.224 The cost of staple foods in Russia bounced up tenfold and many
people survived on reserves of food that they had stockpiled before the
price increases. 2 ' Enough food and fuel exist for everyone in the repub-
lics, but the transportation system simply cannot deliver all the goods.22
More than a quarter of available grain is wasted, and over half the pota-
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toes and fruit rot before getting to consumers. 2 7
To preserve themselves, trade unions are positioned in the front of a
growing popular movement of dissatisfaction. 2 8 The unions appeal to
people angry over shortages, and seek to link wages to prices, as well as to
have industry spend more of its revenue on pay.2 28 However, if the repub-
lics try to buy stability by buying off workers, catastrophic hyperinflation
could result and may jeopardize the whole reform movement.
Over sixty years of ethnic repression by the manipulative central
planners is erupting in violence.
a. Ethnic factions in Afghanistan are warring.2
b. Muslim-dominated Azerbaijan intensified an embargo against
mostly Christian Armenia during the week of Nov. 4, 1991, by cutting
off all natural gas shipments. 231 As a result, Armenia closed all but
essential factories and limited TV broadcasts to one hour per day to
conserve energy.232 The economic situation in Armenia is worsening,
and as of March, 1992, no cease-fire had been negotiated.
2 32
c. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic declared indepen-
dence from Russia and armed a 3,000 man militia with weapons pur-
chased from Hungary.22 4
d. The Uzbeks have ongoing feuds with people in their bordering
republics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenia. 285
There is no consensus about what to do next. Instead, the leaders of
this struggling group of newly born sovereignties continue to scrap among
themselves. Fighting erupted in Georgia in October of 1991 between op-
position forces and supporters of President Gamsakhurdia, who was being
accused of dictator-like actions since his election the previous May.23 8
Thousands of Communist protestors clashed with Moscow riot police in
late February of 1992, denouncing President Yeltsin.237 The Russian Vice
President, Alexander Rutskoi, has lead the opposition to Boris Yeltsin's
economic policies by openly criticizing the Russian plan to liberalize
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prices before privatizing industry."' Citing the same issues as Rutskoi,
Moscow mayor and long-time Yeltsin ally Gavril Popov resigned in late
December. A number of the elected Presidents of the smaller republics
are the same Communists that lead them before, but the new freedoms
have them keenly interested in developing their backward economies.2 83
Indications are that they will no longer wait for leadership from the larger
republics if they can establish diplomatic relations directly with the West
to secure economic help.
B. Revisiting East-West Joint Ventures Today
The first issue that Western businesses have to consider is who to
deal with. Though the emergence of fifteen new possibilities is daunting,
complications may actually be lessened since the central Ministry maze
will soon be nonexistent. The current joint venture deal making steps of
discussion, negotiation and registration remain logical ones to continue,
though registration will now likely be with a republic government. With-
out guidance from the Soviet central core and no precedent for many of
the republics to follow, it is even more critical than before that Western
partners remember and use to the benefit of the joint venture, the CIS
people's love of the written word. Specificity of all conceivable venture
terms in writing is a must.
Potential new developments in the eight areas of law and operations
usually negotiated in a joint venture are discussed below.
1. Contribution Valuation
While the CIS Republics are struggling with how to establish a mon-
etary system, problems with contribution valuation will not improve. The
emergence of a market economy will be the main long term remedy. In
the short term, Western partners should plan to continue assisting their
CIS partners with valuation procedures, while using evidence of previous
sales and valuations in the Eastern Bloc for foundation.
2. Profit Repatriation
The ruble is still the root of the trouble in this area, and the move to
a market economy is the ultimate key to the solution. Western interests
will continue to press for ways to make profits for the CIS citizenry, and
this may become more likely without the central government standing
guard. In the short term, counter-trade deals still appear to be the best
way to convert joint venture profits into hard currency for Western repa-
triation. It may even continue as a long term solution if the quality of CIS
produced goods improve.
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Three generations of citizens have accepted the idea that the state
owns virtually everything. Even as Moscow and some republics move to-
ward private ownership of property, it is questionable how quickly such a
shift can be made or if it will be made in all parts of the CIS. Ownership
of things like mineral rights may be hard to sever from republic govern-
ments in cases like Afganistan, where over half of the republic's income is
from natural gas sales. Western partners should watch these laws closely
but be prepared to continue operations as before.
4. Financing
Continued movement on project financing can be expected since
there is even less assurance that CIS partners can be held financially re-
sponsible for their part of any deal. Financiers can be expected to con-
tinue to rely heavily on the Western partner and look to the joint venture
itself for their return on investment.
5. Taxes
There will likely be major shifts in tax laws as the republics rush to
raise hard currency from the only existing enterprises linked to a market
economy. Westerners should expect new tax laws in republics that have
never had them before. Tax laws may also be issued coincidentally with
laws that allow more privatization of industry. Employees may get a
break, however, if the republics move to ease some of the burden their
citizens are carrying due to the move toward a market economy.
6. Dispute Resolution
Arbitrazh is likely to cease to exist in its current form as a forum for
dispute resolution, and use of U.S. courts hold no better promise than
before. Arbitration carefully outlined in the joint venture agreement still
appears to be the best alternative. Western partners should be more cau-
tious than ever about negotiating these terms with CIS partners.
7. Labor
Labor law may have less impact than the expectations of the work
force. The concept of having a right to work has long been seen as an
entitlement to a present job. The power of the trade unions to control
discipline and challenge management won't soon be forgotten.
Potentially, Western business partners should take cues from the
General Electric Co. Tungstran factory established in Budapest, Hun-
gary, twenty months ago. General Electric found that schools haven't pre-
pared workers for a demand economy.24 ° One Western manager gathers
240. Roger Thurow, Seeing the Light, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1991, at R2.
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his Hungarian managers every morning to see what can be learned from
problems in the previous twenty-four hours. "What I often get is an elo-
quent detailed description of what went wrong and what the current situ-
ation is, but absolute silence about a plan to go forward to solve it," he
says.2 4
1
General Electric has established "business made easy" courses where
everyone, including janitors through executives, learns that profit is not a
bad word.24 2 There are sensitivity classes which teach that criticism of
processes and work patterns is necessary. A weekly newsletter has re-
placed the sayings of Lenin with those of Lombardi; "We want to win,
not just exist. '243 The going will not be easy, especially since economic
pressures are likely to cost some workers their jobs. In the words of a
female factory worker, "Everything belonged to the workers: the factory
and the machinery. Now they just tell us to get out. 244
8. Procurement and Quality
Transportation problems simply must be solved. This will be tricky,
even if the republics negotiate open trade among themselves. How do you
teach the value of good quality to people who are accustomed to standing
in line to buy whatever is available? It will not be easy, but McDonald's
and Pepsico's experiences show that it can be done. Pressures from meet-
ing market demands, and the emerging awareness that people have a
right to good quality, will help address these problems in the long term.
C. Three More Barriers: The Ruble, Banking and the Law
The worthless ruble, the nonexistent banking system, and a legal sys-
tem designed to promote Communist Party goals rather than objectivity
are three immense difficulties that must be attacked soon.
1. The Ruble
The ruble never served the traditional role of money. It was neither a
medium of exchange, nor an item of value.245 In September of 1991, the
Soviet Union printed rubles as fast as possible for masses of transac-
tions.2" However, the uncontrolled printing fuelled by rising wages was
not matched by increased production, and hyperinflation resulted. 4" The
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from thirty-two rubles to the dollar to forty-seven rubles to the dollar. 24 8
The black market rate then was around seventy rubles to the dollar and
banks got seventy seven rubles to the dollar at Moscow auctions.2 49 The
slide in value became a frightening plunge. But Russian central bank offi-
cials tightened credit at the beginning of the year, reduced the supply of
rubles in circulation, and began a delicate support intervention. As a re-
sult, the ruble has seen some stabilization, trading at 170 per dollar in
late February, 1992, up from 230 rubles per dollar at the end of
January.25
A possible long term solution would be to enact a Russian version of
the Bretton Woods system used for twenty-five years following World
War H.2" ' Under the system, the U.S. kept its currency convertible to
gold at a fixed rate and other countries wanting to engage in the system
agreed to keep the value of their own currencies in terms of the dollar at
fixed rates.252 This system provided monetary stability and promoted
trade among the members.2 " Gold may be the most acceptable founda-
tion for sound money. 25 4 Most important, the ex-Soviets have substantial
gold holdings. CIA estimates have put the amount at about twenty-five
billion dollars, which is enough to start minting coins in troy ounces.2 5 5
2. Banking
The problem of ruble non-convertability is heavily complicated by
the lack of an efficient banking system that enables money to move easily
from one section of the economy to another, for example from farming to
food stores.25 6 The CIS lacks savings bonds, mutual funds, checking ac-
counts and credit cards.2 57 Factories dole out payrolls in paper rubles;
there is no such thing as a paycheck.2 5 8 Since CIS citizens can't put their
money to work for them, the economy lacks what is called a multiplier
effect. If a U.S. consumer spends a dollar to buy milk, that money ulti-
mately goes to pay the store clerk who uses it to buy a shirt.2 5 9 The buck
does not stop anywhere in a healthy economy. 260 What citizens do instead
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is stuff their pockets with rubles so, if they are walking near a shop and
see something on sale, they can buy an item before the rubles devalue.2 6 '
The issue of banking operations will be particularly difficult since the
republics have no history of managing their own spending.2 62 The central
bank collected all revenues and gave out what it chose in return.2 63 The
republics will have to learn the operation of balance sheets and a proper
system of debits and credits.
2 6 4
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other
similar institutions will have a special role to play by putting up both
equity, as well as the knowledge and personnel resources to train and
build local management. '65
3. The Law
The Soviet legal system has been characterized by two features: inac-
cessibility of the laws, and dealing with the bureaucracy.266 The legal sys-
tem, because of central planning, was largely administrative with tens of
thousands of internal regulations, many of which were not published.2 6 7
Those regulations that were published were limited in number and not
generally available.2
68
There is no judicial system that will enforce contracts, and the role of
the lawyer has been that of an enforcer, not a deal maker."6 9 A typical
Soviet negotiation team prior to 1987 limited the role of lawyers to mere
technicians, summoning them only when negotiations reached a technical
question. 7 0 Lawyers had no authority to vary the text of a clause from a
form book.271
Corporation law remains in its infancy. Under the 1987 Joint Venture
Decree, the joint venture is considered a "judicial person subject to Soviet
law;" there is no broader corporation law.2 7 2 There are no publications
that guide writing a valid contract, and no explanation of the legal conse-
quences of signing a contract prior to registration with authorities.273 It is
uncertain at what point in the deal process the joint venture takes effect.
261. Id.
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Workers have been consciously favored by the court in labor dis-
putes. 27 1' Soviet jurists boast about this bias, saying it is a strength of
their "socialist" court system.2 75 In addition, courts have directions that
they are to eliminate the improper labor practices they encounter and to
instill in the citizenry a "communist attitude" toward work. 7 6 In short,
they have not been a neutral forum for dispute resolution, but an impor-
tant instrument of state policy.2"
D. Trade Continues
Despite political upheavals, trade continues. In fact, increased trade
may well be a life giving infusion to the new republics. Polariod has con-
tinued producing camera parts in a two-year joint venture despite the
fact that its chief partner, the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy, no
longer exists.2 78 Coca-Cola says it will switch distribution rights for the
Baltic states from Moscow to its Nordic division in Oslo. 279
Russia's review of current oil export licenses shows that it is likely
many Western agreements will remain intact.'" By early December the
licenses were to be reviewed so that fuel supplies for Russia during the
winter of 1991 were assured, and that republic agreements, international
agreements and treaties concluded in exchange for food, medicine or
technical advice could be fulfilled.
2 8 1
The biggest winner could be Chevron, who has been negotiating for
four years to drill the huge Tenghiz field in Kazakhstan. Without Mos-
cow's continued attempts to derail the deal, Chevron hopes to conclude it
quickly with Kazakh officials.2 2 Amoco negotiated a deal in June 1991
with the Soviets to allow off-shore oil explorations in the Caspian Sea in
Azerbaijan2 s8 The key is to now clarify which republic officials are re-
sponsible for what.284
Huntsman Chemical and Marriott Corp. have a joint venture with
Aeroflot to produce plastic cups for the Soviet carrier's service and hope
to operate a $40 million polystyrene plant in the Ukraine in partnership
with a local cooperative.2 85 Huntsman Chemical also opened a $2.5 mil-
lion cement slab plant in Armenia in June of 1991, and hopes to open a
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building block operation there soon. " 6
The need for new communications systems is critical throughout the
CIS. AT&T sold a sophisticated digital-switching system to the Armenian
government in late 1991,87 and in February of 1992 formed a joint ven-
ture with a Russian telephone equipment manufacturer to adopt AT&T's
network equipment for use in Russia. "8 AT&T also recently signed a pact
with the Ukraine to build and operate a new telephone network.2 8 9
A newly formed Russian trade group created a business center in
New York in mid-December 1991 to link U.S. businesses with their pri-
vately owned Russian counterparts.2 " The intent is to ensure that Rus-
sian enterprises will have direct access to American markets."' A similar
endeavor opened in Washington in October of that same year to link U.S.
entrepreneurs with Moscow companies. 92
VI. CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH
James Madison came to Philadelphia in May of 1787 to expose the
"vices" of confederations. They are inherently ineffectual since they are
based on principles of local sovereignty and a weak central government. '
Both a Constitution and a civil war were needed before the United States
stabilized.
It seems the new CIS republics may be destined to repeat the Ameri-
can past. Fundamental power is in the hands of the republics. This cre-
ates a number of political anomalies; for example the six Muslim repub-
lics will be in a position to outvote Russia, despite Russia's possession of
half the CIS's population. The likelihood of cohesive action on common
interests, such as trade, is diminished. ' 4 Destruction of the union is a
reality that the republics have created, and they must endure it just as
Americans did. The question is whether they will eventually realize the
interests they have in common despite the myriad ethnic, ideological and
historical conflicts. 29 5
VII. CONCLUSION
This essay has charted the recent developments in East-West busi-
ness relations related to joint ventures, the emerging social reform of the
286. Id.
287. John J. Keller, AT&T Sets Accord to Adapt, Sell Gear in Russia, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 13, 1992, at A4.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Neil Barsky, Business Center to Link Russian and U.S. Firms, WALL ST. J., Dec.
16, 1991, at C13.
291. Id.
292. Id.




1992 EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES 469
CIS republics, and attempted to project future developments that West-
ern joint venture partners may encounter. The complexity and magnitude
of the problems facing the CIS cannot be over estimated. Nations impov-
erished by the Soviet experiment need to focus on economic revitaliza-
tion, and on channeling long suppressed energies into economic produc-
tion. Joint ventures with Western partners will quite likely remain a
major part of that effort.
S. Jan Vukovich


















Ukraine 51.4 M 233,144 Coal, iron,
17.9% 2.6% chemicals, rich
farm land
Uzbekistan 19.8 M 172,542 Oil, gas, coal,
6.6% 1.9% copper
Kazakhstan 16.4 M 1,048,762 Coal, oil, zinc,
5.6% 12.0% tungsten, copper,
manganese, lead
Belorussia 10.1 M 80,288 Peat, timber
3.5% .9%'
Azerbaijan 6.8 M 33,582 Oil, gas, iron,
2.3% .38% bauxite, copper
zinc, gold, silver
Georgia 5.4 M 27,020 Coal, oil, timber,
1.8% .31% manganese
Tadzhikistan 4.8 M 55,198 Coal, oil, lead,
1.7% .63% zinc, rare elements
Moldavia 4.2 M 13,464 Lignite, gypsum
1.5% .15%
Kirgizia 4.1 M 76,814 Oil, timber
1.4% .88%
Lithuania 3.6 M 25,090 Timber, peat, amber
1.3% .29%
Armenia 3.4 M 11,580 Copper, zinc,
1.2% .13% bauxite
Turkmenistan 3.5 M 188,368 Oil, coal, sulphur,
1.2% 2.2% magnesium
Latvia 2.6 M 24,704 Peat, amber
.9% .28%
Estonia 1.6 M 17,370 Oil shale, timber
.6% .2%
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